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ACCOUNTABILITY IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN CHINA AND THE IMPACT
OF GUANXI AS A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD
Andrew Keay* and Jingchen Zhao**
ABSTRACT
Accountability is an essential aspect of corporate governance and it has
been argued that the “wenze” system of accountability in China comes very
close to the accountability systems developed in Anglo-American corporate
governance. This Article examines the role of cultural factors, namely
guanxi and its derivatives, in corporate governance in China to determine
what effect, if any, these cultural factors have on the operation and
development of the “wenze” system in large listed companies. The Article
specifically considers whether the cultural elements affect accountability,
and if so, how and to what extent. It also explores whether these cultural
factors are good, bad, or neutral as far as the development of
accountability in fostering good corporate governance is concerned. The
Article advocates a realistic, functional, and culturally sensitive corporate
governance accountability system in China, under which guanxi and its
derivatives will not be regarded as a substitute for accountability, but will
work within the “wenze” system of accountability. Meanwhile, the Article’s
analysis also demonstrates that guanxi is a double-edge sword, for while it
can be an impediment to accountability, it is not totally inimical to ensuring
that there is accountability.
INTRODUCTION
Accountability operates overtly and implicitly as a factor in the field of
corporate governance. 1 In fact, the United Kingdom’s Department for
Business Innovation and Skills2 puts this concept more strongly, and has
stated: “Transparency and accountability are the most important elements
of good corporate governance.” 3 Along similar lines, the International
Federation of Accountants has defined corporate governance as “the
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Business Law and Practice, School of Law, University of Leeds, England and Professorial
Research Fellow, Deakin Law School, Deakin University, Australia.
** LLB; LLM; PhD; Associate Professor of Law, Centre for Business Law and Practice,
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1. See Edward Rubin, The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse, 103
MICH. L. REV. 2073, 2073 (2005); see also Alice Belcher, Codes of Conduct and Accountability
for NHS Boards, 288 PUB. L. 291 (1995).
2. The name of the department was changed to the Department for Business, Energy &
Industrial Strategy in July 2016.
3. Corporate Governance, DEP’T BUS. INNOVATION & SKILL, http://webarchive.national
archives.gov.uk/20090902193559/berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/businesslaw/corp-
governance/page15267.html (last visited Jan. 12, 2015) (emphasis added).
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processes by which organizations are directed, controlled, and held to
account . . . [it is] concerned with structures and processes for decision-
making, accountability, control and behaviour at the top of organizations.”4
The G20/OECD’s Principles of Corporate Governance also makes it plain5
that accountability is a critical element in corporate governance. In like
manner, the Pan-African Consultative Forum on Corporate Governance in
2001 indicated that accountability was one of the key elements of corporate
governance.6 Shortly after that, South Africa’s King Report (King II) on
corporate governance identified accountability as one of seven
characteristics of good corporate governance.7
It has been suggested that good corporate governance can best be
achieved by holding directors accountable for their behavior and decisions,8
and this means that the accountability of the board of directors in a
company is the most important aspect of accountability. The Report of the
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (commonly
known as the Cadbury Report) stated many years ago: “The issue for
corporate governance is how to strengthen the accountability of boards of
directors to shareholders.” 9 It has been argued that accountability of
directors is the basis for the success of all other principles of corporate
governance,10 and such directorial accountability has been said to be at the
heart of good corporate governance.11 It follows that the enhancement of
accountability should lead to better corporate governance.
According to an influential report in China, accountability is regarded
as one of the basic principles of corporate governance that needs to be
4. INT’L FED’N OF ACCOUNTANTS, GOVERNANCE IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: A GOVERNING
BODY PERSPECTIVE 1 (2001).
5. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
51 (2015), http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/Corporate-Governance-Principles-ENG.pdf [hereinafter
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE].
6. Simeon Wanyama, Bruce Burton & Christine Helliar, Stakeholders, Accountability and the
Theory-practice Gap in Developing Nations’ Corporate Governance Systems: Evidence from
Uganda, 13 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L J. BUS. SOC’Y 18, 22 (2013).
7. INST. OF DIR., KING COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
OF THE KING REPORT 2002 10–11 (2002), http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/executive_
summary.pdf. The other ingredients of good corporate governance were said to be discipline,
transparency, independence, responsibility, fairness, and social responsibility. Id.
8. See JILL SOLOMON & ARIS SOLOMON, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY
14 (2004); see also Emily Makuta, Towards Good Corporate Governance in State-Owned
Industries: The Accountability of Directors, 3 MALAWI L.J. 55, 56 (2009).
9. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE FINANCIAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ¶
6.1 (2015).
10. See Makuta, supra note 8, at 56; see generally ANDREW KEAY, BOARD ACCOUNTABILITY
IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2015).
11. See ALICE BELCHER, DIRECTORS’ DECISIONS AND THE LAW 183 (2014); see also Angus
Young, Frameworks in Regulating Company Directors: Rethinking the Philosophical
Foundations to Enhance Accountability, 30 COMPANY LAW. 355, 356 (2009).
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consistently enforced.12 A problem that exists is that “accountability” is an
English word that is not easily translated into other languages. It has been
translated in China using different Chinese words, since the Chinese
language does not have a word that singularly encapsulates the English
word, especially as used in relation to corporate governance.13 The Chinese
word that has been used most often as a translation for accountability is
“wenze,”14 but this is not completely equivalent to what the English word
means, and does not appear to embrace all of the nuances of the concept of
accountability as determined in Anglo-American corporate governance
systems. The use of wenze in China is either too narrow, because it is
focused on the process of undertaking enquiries only, 15 or it is
misinterpreted as meaning responsibility.16
Administrative law in China employs an accountability system that
bears some similarities to Anglo-American corporate governance systems,
and this Chinese approach has been referred to as a wenze system.17 It is
envisaged that eventually accountability in the English sense will become
more applicable in China as the country develops a system of corporate
governance that is not completely founded on administrative governance,
but is based more on economic governance, as is the case in Anglo-
American systems. At present, China has a hybrid system combining
elements of both administrative and economic governance.18 This hybrid
corporate governance does not have its goal focused solely on economic
return and wealth maximization. Corporations, especially those that are
State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs), have other missions with administrative
goals such as: the maintenance of urban employment; the improvement of
employment conditions; support for small businesses; the direct control of
key industries such as banking, energy, and telecommunications; and
politically motivated job placement.19 SOEs’ corporate strategy and profit
distributions are closely related to the needs of government, and their board
12. See PROTIVITI & CHINESE ACAD. OF SOC. SCI., CORPORATE GOVERNANCE ASSESSMENT
SUMMARY REPORT ON THE TOP 100 CHINESE LISTED COMPANIES FOR 2012 1 (2013).
13. Andrew Keay & Jingchen Zhao, Ascertaining the Notion of Board Accountability in
Chinese Listed Companies, 46 H.K. L.J. 671, 687 (2016).
14. Id. at 689–92.
15. Yunfeng Li, Accountability and Effectiveness of Corporate Governance (问责动了真格公
司治理才有效), http://www.cnstock.com/08yaowen//sdfx/201112/1753422.htm (last visited July
8, 2015).
16. YIKUN ZHU, INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE AND EFFICIENCY: BOARD OF DIRECTORS (董事
问责：制度结构与效率) 18 (2012).
17. Keay & Zhao, supra note 13, 696–702.
18. See generally Fuxiu Jiang & Kenneth A. Kim, Corporate Governance in China: A Modern
Perspective, 32 J. CORP. FIN. 190 (2015); Jingchen Zhao, Modernising Corporate Objective
Debate Towards a Hybrid Model, 62 N. IR. LEGAL Q. 361 (2011); QIAO LIU, CORPORATE CHINA
2.0: THEGREAT SHAKEUP ch. 5 (2016).
19. Qiao Liu & Zhou Lu, Corporate Governance and Earnings Management in the Chinese
Listed Companies: A Tunnelling Perspective, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 881, 884 (2007).
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members always have a close relation with the government or civil
servants.20
This system relied on decentralized administrative governance as a key
feature of market management in China prior to and during the transition
period from 1979 to the present day, as the result of government reforms
aimed at enhancing economic efficiency. 21 The government, when it
intervenes in the business decision-making process, always does so by
employing administrative action or imposing administrative sanctions. This
approach has been subject to criticism because it produces an inefficient
system of operations.22 This administrative corporate governance has less
impact on non-SOE listed companies, because their shareholders and
directors usually do not have such a strong relationship with the
government. This Article submits that the wenze system that presently
applies in relation to administrative law can be modified to apply to the
hybrid corporate governance model, one that involves greater economic
governance.
In examining what any country should embrace in relation to its
corporate governance system, consideration must be given to the fact that
each will have different historical and social underpinnings. There is a clear
suggestion that “the lesson of history . . . is that while markets have always
been there, they have always operated in the context of geography, religion,
language, folk ways, families, armies, and government, never in a
vacuum.” 23 This is consistent with what is known as path dependence
theory, which provides “that an outcome or decision is shaped in specific
and systematic ways by the historical path leading to it,” as well as by other
factors within the socio-economic context.24 As part of the domestic legal
and financial framework, a corporate law system has significant sources of
path dependence, which include historical accidents as well as economic
and political issues and elements that are particular to the domestic
system. 25 The corporate governance system in China, and particularly
aspects of its enforcement and ambit, are likely to be very different than
they are elsewhere due to a number of factors, such as the country’s
20. See generally John P. Burns, Civil Service Reform in China, ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION
DEV. J. BUDGETING, July 2007, at 17.
21. Especially under the Xi–Li Administration in 2012. See WILLY WO-LAP LAM, CHINESE
POLITICS IN THE ERA OFXI JINPING: RENAISSANCE, REFORM, OR RETROGRESSION? ch. 4 (2015).
22. Victor Nee, Sonja Opper & Sonia Wong, Developmental State and Corporate Governance
in China, 3 MGMT. ORG. REV. 19, 19–24 (2007); Cindy A. Schipani & Junhai Liu, Corporate
Governance in China: Then and Now, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 28–31 (2002).
23. KARL MOORE & DAVID LEWIS, FOUNDATIONS OF CORPORATE EMPIRE: IS HISTORY
REPEATING ITSELF 219 (2000).
24. Oona A. Hathaway, The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System,
86 IOWA L. REV. 601, 604 (2001).
25. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path Dependence in
Corporate Governance and Ownership, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127 (2000).
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political evolution, its socialist underpinnings, and its rich and unique
culture, the latter having developed over thousands of years.
Cultural issues26 have been a crucial element for determining the nature
of corporate governance in China and it is one of the factors that has had a
favorable impact on both the effectiveness and efficiency of business
operations. One critical aspect of Chinese culture is encompassed by the
term “guanxi,” and its related derivatives, which are the subject of this
Article. The roles of guanxi, which means “personal
connections/relationships,” and other cultural derivatives related to guanxi,
such as “renqing” (reciprocity), gift giving, “mianzi” (face), and “xinren”
(trust) in Chinese business culture provide dramatic examples of entrenched
cultural norms that are under pressure from the evolution of international
business trends. The relationship between Chinese culture and the Chinese
business model is complex and multidimensional.27 Guanxi is examined
here because of its strong impact on and in the business world and in the
governance environment. It is an influential component of governance
culture. 28 Guanxi is regarded as “the durable social connections and
networks a firm uses to exchange favors for organizational purposes.”29
Furthermore, it is argued that guanxi is de facto based on Confucian
ideology,30 a central life philosophy for many aspects of Chinese life. It
teaches filial piety, loyalty, harmony, and reciprocity as the basis for
maintaining good guanxi,31 and the foundation to enable Chinese people to
get through life. Guanxi remains rooted in Confucianism that connects
social order and virtue. The Chinese have turned the art of personal
relationships into a carefully calculated science, and there are people whose
lives rely heavily upon guanxi.32 It is generally recognized that guanxi can
have both positive and negative effects in society and in business
specifically.
26. For general discussions on corporate governance and culture, see generally Amir N. Licht,
Culture and Law in Corporate Governance (European Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper
No. 247/2014, Mar. 2014).
27. Ying Fan, A Classification of Chinese Culture, 7 CROSS CULTURALMGMT. 3, 3 (2000). It
is worth mentioning that Chinese Confucian culture and corporate governance have been
discussed widely. See generally Charles A. Rarick, Confucius on Management: Understanding
Chinese Cultural Values and Managerial Practices, 2 J. INT’L MGMT. STUD. 22 (2007); Irene
Y.M. Yeung & Rosalie L. Tung, Achieving Business Success in Confucian Societies: The
Importance of Guanxi (Connections), 25 ORG. DYNAMICS 54 (1996); Tong Chee Kiong & Yong
Pit Kee, Guanxi Bases, Xinyong and Chinese Business Network, 49 BRIT. J. SOC. 75 (1998).
28. Liang Guo, Clive Smallman & Jack Radford, A Critique of Corporate Governance in
China, 55 INT’L J.L. &MGMT. 257, 267–68 (2013).
29. Flora F. Gu, Kineta Hung & David K. Tse, When Does Guanxi Matter? Issues of
Capitalization and Its Dark Sides, 72 J. MARKETING 12, 12 (2008).
30. FOX BUTTERFIELD, CHINA: ALIVE IN BITTER SEA 80 (1983).
31. See generally Xuezhi Guo, Dimensions of Guanxi in Chinese Elite Politics, 46 CHINA J. 69
(2001).
32. BUTTERFIELD, supra note 30, at 80.
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Despite the fact that the relationships between Chinese culture, history,
and traditions have been discussed widely, the research that has been done
has focused on how culture affects doing business in China in general
terms. The current literature tends to focus on guanxi and business,
cultivating sustainable guanxi in order to perform successfully in China or
in the context of dealing with Chinese business partners. The literature on
corporate governance and guanxi is very limited and dated.33 This Article
explores and analyzes the relationship that exists between guanxi and its
cultural derivatives on the one hand and accountability in corporate
governance on the other. To our knowledge there has not been any study of
this relationship. The Article will contribute to the very limited literature on
both corporate governance and culture, and the notion of accountability in
the domain of Chinese corporate governance. The significance of the
Article lies in the fact that accountability is critical to corporate governance,
and guanxi and its derivatives will necessarily impact corporate governance
in some way because they are essential elements of Chinese business. We
seek to examine how and in what ways they affect accountability.
The research should be relevant not only to Chinese companies and
those concerned with the development of corporate governance in China,
but also to foreign companies that wish to engage in business relationships
with Chinese companies, so that they can understand and, possibly,
accommodate cultural issues. To understand guanxi and its cultural
derivatives in a more rounded fashion, rather than just in a one-sided way,
will enable Western readers to acquire a real picture of these cultural issues
in a “unique Chinese way,” rather than seeking to find equivalent
Westernized relations such as friendship, kinship, or social network to
equate to guanxi. In detail, the research will be beneficial and important for
company board members, including those who are not familiar with
Chinese culture and traditions, to use guanxi and its cultural derivatives in a
positive and sustainable manner in order to enhance board accountability. It
is also significant for company board members to learn from the research so
that they are aware of the challenges and risks in the process of promoting
board excellence, especially in relation to accountability, while dealing with
Chinese companies and these cultural issues. Therefore, guanxi and its
derivatives are important components of cultural factors that could not only
be employed by the board internally while making decisions, but also
studied and investigated so that corrupt and illegal guanxi can be avoided
on the journey towards more accountable companies.
33. Through various popular search engines including: SSRN, Google Scholar, Westlaw, and
Heinonline, we found two articles directly on guanxi and corporate governance. See generally
Udo C. Braendle, Tanja Gasser & Juergen Noll, Corporate Governance in China – Is Economic
Growth Potential Hindered by Guanxi?, 16 BUS. & SOC’Y REV. 389 (2005); David Smith,
Guanxi, Mianzi, and Business: The Impact of Culture on Corporate Governance in China, 26
PRIV. SECTOR OPINION 1 (2012). They did not thoroughly address accountability.
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Since guanxi has been a pervasive part of the Chinese business and
political worlds for the last few centuries, we believe that it binds thousands
of Chinese companies and Chinese board members. The market is not able
to oust the old value; truly successful businesses are always well connected.
This Article advocates a realistic, functional, and culturally sensitive
corporate governance accountability system in China, under which guanxi
and its derivatives will not be regarded as a substitute for accountability, but
will work within the wenze system of accountability.
The first aim of this Article is to critically examine the role of cultural
factors, namely guanxi and its derivatives, in corporate governance in
China, in order to set the scene for our discussion of the relationship
between guanxi and the notion of accountability. The second and main aim
of the Article is to determine what effect, if any, these cultural factors have
on the operation and development of a wenze system in Chinese corporate
governance. The Article specifically considers whether the cultural
elements affect accountability, and if so, how and to what extent. It also
examines whether any such effects are good, bad, or neutral as far as the
development of accountability in fostering good corporate governance is
concerned. We should add that our concern is with large companies in
China, whose shares are listed on a stock exchange.34
The Article is structured as follows. First, Part I provides a brief
discussion of accountability and the Anglo-American development of this
concept in corporate governance, the reason being that the Anglo-American
model is pervasive and is embraced by the G20/OECD’s Principles of
Corporate Governance, which have been influential in the development of
Chinese corporate governance. Part II explains the wenze system of
accountability. Part III follows with an explanation of guanxi and other
related cultural derivatives in the context of a hybrid corporate governance
model in China. Part IV analyzes whether, and to what effect, these cultural
and sociological issues have an impact on accountability in corporate
governance. Part V endeavors to assess whether these cultural concepts
provide obstacles to the development of accountability mechanisms as well
as assessing the possibility of employing guanxi as a factor in the
promotion of accountability in China. The Article will address these
cultural issues from critical, functional and instrumental perspectives.
I. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF ACCOUNTABILITY
IN THE ANGLO-AMERICAN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
SYSTEM
As discussed at the outset, accountability is something that is seen as an
essential element to Anglo-American corporate governance. This concept
34. Primarily this will be on one of China’s two stock exchanges, which are situated at
Shenzhen and Shanghai.
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has been embraced by the G20/OECD in their Principles of Corporate
Governance: “The corporate governance framework should ensure the
strategic guidance of the company, the effective monitoring of management
by the board, and the board’s accountability to the company and the
shareholders.”35 This envisages that the accountability of boards of directors
is the most important element of accountability. Nevertheless, there are
others who need to account within the corporate governance framework,
such as the executives and managers of the company. Notwithstanding the
importance of accountability, there has been a failure to articulate what it
actually means in the context of corporate governance. The concept is
mentioned on many occasions, but is rarely explained and developed.36 This
is likely due to several factors, the leading one perhaps being that
accountability is notoriously difficult to articulate, as it is a complicated and
elusive concept.37
A recent study has argued that accountability in relation to corporate
governance, certainly as far as Anglo-American corporate governance is
concerned, entails a process involving four stages.38 The first stage is that
the “accountor” (i.e., the one who is accountable) needs to provide accurate
information concerning its decisions and actions, so that “accountees” (i.e.,
the ones to whom the accountor is accountable) are informed as to what has
been done by the accountor in relation to the company. A part of this
process encompasses transparency, which involves disclosure and
furnishing reports concerning the work of the accountor.39 The second stage
involves an accountor explaining and justifying the things for which it is
responsible, including what it has done and what it has failed to do.40 Often
this is seen as the predominant aspect of accountability, involving the
accountor being answerable for what it has done, and it is this stage that is
often focused on by elements of the accountability literature dealing with
other areas of society and law. The third stage constitutes the questioning
and evaluating of the accountor’s reasons for what has been done.41 The
fourth and final stage is that there is the possibility, but not the requirement,
35. PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATEGOVERNANCE, supra note 5, at 51.
36. KEAY, supra note 10, at 36.
37. ROBERT D. BEHN, RETHINKING DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABILITY 221 (2001); Amanda
Sinclair, The Chameleon of Accountability: Forms and Discourses, 20 ACCT. ORG. SOC’Y 219,
221 (1995); Istemi Demirag, Melvin J. Dubnick & M. Iqbal Khadaroo, Exploring the Relationship
Between Accountability and Performance in the UK’s Private Financial Initiative (PFI), 7, 20–21
(Sept. 2004) (paper presented at the Conference on Governing the Corporation: Mapping the Loci
of Power in Corporate Governance Design, Queen’s University, Belfast); Mark Bovens, Analysing
and Assessing Accountability: A Conceptual Framework, 13 EUR. L.J. 447, 448–49 (2007).
38. See Andrew Keay & Joan Loughrey, The Framework for Board Accountability in
Corporate Governance, 35 LEGAL STUD. 252, 266–67 (2015).
39. Amir N. Licht, Accountability and Corporate Governance, 10, 23 (Sept. 2002),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=328401.
40. ACCOUNTABILITY, AA1000 8 (Nov. 1999).
41. Keay & Loughrey, supra note 38, at 267.
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of the imposition of consequences.42 This might simply entail the provision
of feedback to the accountor. It might, but it need not, constitute negative
consequences that could involve some sort of sanction, perhaps involving
the removal of one or more directors or managers, or the decision not to re-
elect a director when his or her term comes to an end.
II. THEWENZE SYSTEM AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN
CHINA
As mentioned earlier, the English word “accountability” is not easily
translated into different languages, and over time there have been several
Chinese words used to translate accountability. 43 One word that is
frequently used is “wenze.” It has been argued that wenze is the most used
and appropriate Chinese word to encompass the meaning of
accountability.44 It is translated as accountability in many English language
documents, especially in relation to corporate governance. We have noted
in prior work that, when combined with “zhi,” it provides a term that can be
translated as “accountability system.”45 Chen has argued that “wenze zhi” is
a system implementing balanced rights and responsibility mechanisms via
an institutionalized questioning process.46 He described the wenze system as
one that clarifies and balances rights and responsibilities through a
systematic enquiry process in order to minimize risks from the actions of
internal management. 47 It is commonly agreed that wenze is critical to
promoting the development of the corporate governance system in China
after the financial crisis of 2008.48 Wenze does not exactly reflect all aspects
of accountability that were identified earlier, but it is the Chinese term that
comes closest to the understanding of accountability as it applies in Anglo-
American systems and in international documents such as the G20/OECD’s
Principles of Corporate Governance.
It has been suggested that the content and procedure of a wenze system
in the context of corporate governance is able to facilitate an effective
accountability mechanism as far as China is concerned, providing, for
example, investors with the means to make enquiries and assess the actions
of the board of directors and senior managers in order to make them
accountable for their decisions and actions. However, while this wenze
42. Id.
43. See Keay & Zhao, supra note 13, at 689–95.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Zhibin Chen, Effective Enforcement of Accountability and Internal Control, 7 ACCT. RES.
9 (2004).
47. Id.
48. Xinrong Gong, Perplexity and Countermeasures of Judicial Intervention in Corporate
Governance in China – New Thinking Under the Background of Financial Crisis of Wall Street (
我国司法介入公司治理的迷惑及对策——华尔街金融危机背景下的新思考), 27 TR. POL. SCI.
& L. 8 (2009).
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system has not been introduced in either legislation or the corporate
governance code thus far,49 it has been argued that it could be introduced
into either or both to good effect.50
Accountability is clearly not something that is limited to corporate
governance. In China, political reforms involving the introduction of an
accountability system were introduced to make government officials more
responsive to societal demands and more accountable for their performance
as civil servants.51 Government institutions have been established for this
purpose, including legislative oversight committees, supervision
committees, Communist Party discipline committees, and internal
administration reconsideration procedures. An accountability system for
government officials (“ganbu wenze zhi”, 干部问责制) is regarded as the
most important of these.52 The importance placed on the enquiry process
within the wenze system is regarded as the result of government officials
not being accountable for their decisions. The development of the market
economy makes the government accountability reforms particularly
important as China becomes increasingly open and diverse.
In relation to corporate governance, it is recognized that in Chinese
listed companies, directors’ rights and responsibilities need to be clarified in
order to make their enforceability more credible. The professionalism and
competitiveness of Chinese directors have been questioned, and reforms
through corporate governance mechanisms and corporate law changes have
been recommended. 53 These problems are widely recognized in China,
especially for directors in SOEs. It is equally important for the enhancement
of greater transparency and accountability in companies generally.
49. CHINA SECURITIES REGULATORY COMMISSION, CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR
LISTED COMPANIES IN CHINA (2001).
50. See Keay & Zhao, supra note 13.
51. See Dong Chen, On Construction of Effective Law System of Administrative
Accountability, HEBEI L. REV. (HEBEI FAXUE 河北法学) (2007); Bill K. P. Chou, Does “Good
Governance” Matter? Civil Service Reform in China, 31 INT’L J. PUB. ADMIN. 54 (2007).
52. Suisheng Zhao, The China Model of Development: Can it Replace Western Model of
Modernization?, in IN SEARCH OF CHINA’S DEVELOPMENT MODEL: BEYOND THE BEIJING
CONSENSUS 52 (S. Philip. Hsu, Yushan Wu & Suisheng Zhao eds., 2011).
53. See LIAO CHUN, THE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURE OF CHINESE FIRMS (2009); Jingjing
Yang, Jing Chi & Martin Young, A Review of Corporate Governance in China, 25 ASIAN-PAC.
ECON. LITERATURE 15, 25 (2011); Nandini Rajagopalan & Yan Zhang, Corporate Governance
Reform in China and India: Challenges and Opportunities, 51 BUS. HORIZONS 55, 55–56 (2008);
Yan-Leung Cheung, Ping Jiang, Piman Limpaphayom & Tong Lu, Does Corporate Governance
Matter in China, 19 CHINA ECON. REV. 460, 460–61 (2008); Heibatollah Sami, Justin Wang &
Haiyan Zhou, Corporate Governance and Operating Performance of Chinese Listed Firms, 20 J.
INT’LACCT. AUDITING& TAX’N 106 (2011); Lilian Miles & Zhong Zhang, Improving Corporate
Governance in State-Owned Corporations in China: Which Way Forward?, 6 J. CORP. L. STUD.
213, 232 (2006); Shaomin Li, China’s (Painful) Transition from Relation-based to Rule-based
Governance: When and How, Not If and Why, 21 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 567, 574
(2013); Guangdong Xu, Tianshu Zhou, Bin Zeng & Jin Shi, Directors’ Duties in China, 14 EUR.
BUS. ORG. L. REV. 57, 87 (2013).
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The concept of a wenze accountability system provides opportunities to
develop wenze in companies in a manner that is in line with the Anglo-
American understanding of accountability, and which will benefit the
development of the Chinese corporate governance system as an economic
model. Unlike the essence of wenze itself, the wenze system could include
dimensions with a rather wide scope relating to a process of balancing
rights and responsibilities through enquiry and disclosure. The system
requires directors and managers to be accountable and it includes, in a
logical order, the following four dimensions54 as far as the directors and
managers are concerned: being responsible and exercising due diligence
(“jinze,” 尽责 or “lüze,” 履责 ); clarifying and providing information
concerning directorial and managerial responsibility, setting standards, and
explaining, analyzing and justifying the responsibility the directors and
managers have been given (“mingze,” 明责); and wenze in a narrow sense,
focusing on an enquiry into the actions of the accountor (“wenze,”问责).55
It is highlighted that, in order to enforce and implement the accountability
system, mingze (明责) is the foundation, lüze (履责) is the key to ensure the
achievement of assigned tasks, and wenze (问责) can be regarded as the
safeguard.56 The logical flow of the four dimensions of a wenze system
described above is important to bridge the gap, for example, between the
expectations of the roles played by the board of directors and the reality of
actual board performance.
As suggested above, the broad scope of the wenze system seems to
come close to covering the four stages of accountability discussed in the
previous section, and arguably extant in many Anglo-American systems,
including providing accurate information concerning decisions and actions
(“xize,” 析 责 ), explaining and justifying that for which there is
responsibility (“mingze,” 明责), questioning and evaluating the reasons
provided by the accountor (“zhize,” 质 责 ), and the imposition of
consequences (“chengze,” 惩责 or “baoze,” 褒责 ). The wenze system
mirrors many elements of accountability, including xize, mingze, zhize, and
chengze/baoze, as it applies in Anglo-American systems, and these
elements could provide a scheme of accountability in China that will enable
substantial accountability to take place and this should foster good
corporate governance.
This wenze system can be regarded as a trend that should be adopted in
relation to Chinese corporate governance to enable China to develop its
54. The wenze system is able to accommodate a number of dimensions. ‘Ze’ is the noun and
‘wen’, ‘ming’, ‘bao’, ‘cheng’ and ‘xi’ are verbs; this is an accurate way to compose a word in
Chinese grammar. These four phrases can be regarded as four dimensions of the wenze system.
55. Keay & Zhao, supra note 13, at 697–98.
56. Yin Jiaxu emphasises in the Discipline Inspection Group Company 2014 Training Session:
“Discipline should focus on fulfilling its oversight responsibilities (尹家绪在集团公司 2014年纪
委书记培训班上强调：纪委要聚焦主业 履行好监督责任)”, http://www.norincogroup.com.cn/
cn/newsdetail.aspx?id=34423&type=1 (last visited Mar. 24, 2016).
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own unique accountability system, based on a constantly changing and
unique corporate governance model, and reflecting the fact that the
development of its corporate governance is affected by path dependence.
Due to the existence of a number of factors it is necessary for China’s
corporate governance to be unique. These factors include the deeply rooted
Confucian philosophy, government interference and participation in
companies (especially SOEs), and the distinctive shareholder structure that
resulted from privatization, as well as the unique guanxi tradition that is the
subject of this Article and which we now come to consider in detail.
III. GUANXI AND RELATED CULTURAL ISSUES WITHIN THE
HYBRID CHINESE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE MODEL
Political institutions determine the characteristics of corporate
governance and the culture practiced in a jurisdiction. This is particularly
true in China. China’s feudal history has had a strong impact on the Chinese
legal system due to path dependence. Chinese society has been traditionally
and heavily influenced by values related to Confucianism, which are keen
to promote a strict system of norms and propriety directing and guiding
human behavior. It is recognized that cultural heritage may have a direct
impact on the development and efficiency of corporate governance. 57
Networks form an important aspect of doing business in China, and one
often hears of guanxi, mianzi, and renqing.58 They are forms of social
capital that we need to investigate in a critical manner as they create and
enhance value, but they also might well hinder free market competition and
the functioning market forces.
Over the past few decades a great deal of literature has been produced
regarding the importance of guanxi, which is “variously translated as social
relations, personal connection or particularistic ties.”59 As noted already, it
plays an important role in Chinese culture, and it has long been established
57. See Charles Kwan Nam Lam & Say Hak Goo, Confucianism: A Fundamental Cure to the
Corporate Governance Problems in China, 35 COMPANY LAW. 52, 55–57 (2014); Jingchen Zhao
& Shuangge Wen, Gift Giving, Guanxi and Confucianism in a Harmonious Society: What Chinese
Law Could Learn from English Law on Aspects of Directors’ Duties, 34 COMPANY LAW. 381,
382–84 (2013); Wen Qu & Philomena Leung, Culture Impact on Chinese Corporate Disclosure –
A Corporate Governance Perspective, 21 MANAGERIAL AUDITING J. 241, 243–44 (2006); Lei
Wang & Heikki Juslin, The Impact of Chinese Culture on Corporate Social Responsibility: The
Harmony Approach, 88 J. BUS. ETHICS 433, 439–40 (2009); David Smith, Guanxi, Mianzi and
Business: The Impact of Culture on Corporate Governance in China, 26 PRIV. SECTOR OPINION
1, 6–8 (2012).
58. YUNXIANG YAN, THE FLOW OF GIFTS: RECIPROCITY AND SOCIAL NETWORKS IN A
CHINESEVILLAGE 74–122 (1996).
59. Andrew B. Kipins, The Language of Gift: Managing Guanxi in a North China Village, 22
MOD. CHINA 285, 285 (1996). For more discussion on the importance of guanxi in contemporary
Chinese society see Dennis B.K. Hwang & A Blair Staley, An Analysis of Recent Accounting and
Auditing Failures in the United States on US Accounting and Auditing in China, 20 MANAGERIAL
AUDITING J. 227, 230–31 (2005).
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that national culture is a deeply rooted causal factor shaping corporations’
forms, customs, and performance.60 Guanxi, a system of tight, close-knit
networks among people,61 has played a significant role in the Confucian-
dominated Chinese society for almost two thousand years. With the impact
of Chinese history and culture, the concept of guanxi and other closely
related cultural issues make the Chinese definition of social capital unique.
These cultural issues have a direct relationship with what occurs in the
business world and they impact corporate profits,62 efficiency in reaching
agreement about sales contracts, 63 companies’ accounting and market
performance,64 and, of course, the area that we are considering: corporate
governance.
A. GUANXI
Guanxi is, in essence, a coalition-based network of stakeholders sharing
resources for survival, and it plays an important role in achieving business
success in China. It has been defined in various ways and the literature
contains no consensus as to its definition or translation. 65 It has been
described as tight, close-knit networks,66 interpersonal connections,67 or a
“gate/pass.” 68 Etymologically, guan is a derivative word for “door” or
“pass” and xi is a rather old word with the connotation of hierarchy. Guanxi
literally means door into a hierarchy or group.69 Westerners have always
regarded it as a “mysterious, yet vital, ingredient in successful Chinese
business activities.”70 A mechanism can be established through guanxi that
enables companies to seek and develop working partnerships in an
60. See, e.g., Amir N. Licht, The Mother of All Path Dependencies: Towards a Cross-Cultural
Theory of Corporate Governance Systems, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 147 (2001); Amir N. Licht, The
Maximands of Corporate Governance: A Theory of Values of Cognitive Style, 29 DEL. J. CORP. L.
649, 677–79 (2004).
61. Yeung & Tung, supra note 27, at 54.
62. Jin Ai, Guanxi Networks in China: Its Importance and Future Trends, 14 CHINA &
WORLD ECON. 105, 115–16 (2006).
63. Yadong Luo, Guanxi and Performance of Foreign-Invested Enterprises in China: An
Empirical Inquiry, 37 MGMT. INT’L REV. 51, 63–67 (1997).
64. Yadong Lou & Min Chen, Does Guanxi Influence Firm Performance?, 14 ASIA PAC. J.
MANAG. 1, 14 (1997).
65. Anne S. Tsui & Jing-Lih Larry Farh, Where Guanxi Matters: Relational Demography and
Guanxi in the Chinese Context, 24 WORK&OCCUPATIONS 56, 59–61 (1997).
66. Yeung & Tung, supra note 27, at 54.
67. Katherine R. Xin & Jone L. Pearce, Guanxi: Connections as Substitutes for Formal
Institutional Support, 39 ACAD. MGMT. J. 1641, 1642 (1996).
68. Yeung & Tung, supra note 27, at 55.
69. HAROLD CHEE & CHRISTOPHER WEST, MYTHS ABOUT DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 63
(2004).
70. YING LUN SO & ANTHONY WALKER, EXPLAINING GUANXI: THE CHINESE BUSINESS
NETWORK, 1 (2006).
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environment characterized by uncertainty and a relatively weak legal
framework.71
Guanxi is a double-edged sword. 72 There are arguable benefits of
building an extensive guanxi network,73 such as reducing transaction costs,
operational uncertainty, information costs, contextual hazards, and
competitive threats. Other benefits include enhancing institutional support,
better economic returns, business effectiveness, organizational legitimacy,
and strategic capability, in order to provide more efficient mechanisms for
transactions by acting as the catalyst for the development of new market
channels and investment opportunities.74 Nevertheless, it can also be argued
that guanxi is closely related to corruption, bribery, reciprocal favors, and
gift giving targeted at illicit transactions.75 Notwithstanding this, it has been
asserted that guanxi differs from bribery and corruption, as the former
focuses on long-term relationships, rather than just the material interests
that might be exchanged, while the latter is focused on what is actually
exchanged, with the relationship simply being a means to an end. 76
Moreover, in guanxi there is an emotional element, but this is not the case
in bribery or corruption.77 Maintaining guanxi is normally related to an
indirect, ultimate purpose of establishing long-term relationships with
individuals or organizations, and doing this might be regarded in some
contexts as leading to improper actions. Also, guanxi has the potential on
the one hand to engender trust, but on the other hand it can also threaten
trust, particularly in organizations such as companies.78
Chinese businesspersons have spent a significant amount of time,
money, and energy to cultivate close guanxi with people who have political
and economic bargaining power. “La” (“establishing”) guanxi is regarded
as the most common strategy applied by the Chinese in order to establish
71. See generally Yadong Luo, Industrial Dynamics and Managerial Networking in an
Emerging Market: the Case of China, 24 STRATEGICMGMT. J. 1315 (2003).
72. Braendle, Gasser & Noll, supra note 33, at 390.
73. Dong-Jin Lee, Jae H. Pae & Y.H. Wong, A Model of Close Business Relationship in China
(guanxi), 35 EURO. J. MARKETING 51, 53 (2001); see also Steve Lovett, Lee C. Simmons & Raja
Kali, Guanxi Versus the Market: Ethics and Efficiency, 30 J. INT’L BUS. STUD. 231, 231–32
(1999).
74. YADONG LUO, GUANXI AND BUSINESS 48–49 (2000).
75. Philip Wright, W.F. Szeto & Louis T.W. Cheng, Guanxi and Professional Conduct in
China: A Management Development Perspective, 13 INT’L J. HUM. RESOURCEMGMT. 156, 168–
70 (2002); Dan Nile & Anna-Maija Lamsa, The Leader-Member Exchange Theory in the Chinese
Context and the Ethical Challenge of Guanxi, 128 J. BUS. ETHICS 851, 857 (2015).
76. Mayfair Mei-Hui Yang, The Resilience of Guanxi and its New Deployment: A Critique of
Some New Guanxi Scholarship, 170 CHINAQ. 459, 465 (2002).
77. Lovett, Simmons & Kali, supra note 73, at 234.
78. Chao C. Chen & Xiao-ping Chen, Negative Externalities of Close Guanxi Within
Organizations, 26 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 37, 39 (2009).
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networks.79 The effects are to build up relationships with others where there
was no pre-existing relationship between them, or where an existing
relationship is not close enough to be useful. The impact of guanxi xue
(“relationology”) percolates through the political, economic, social,
cultural, and other spheres of life.80 Guanxi has been identified as one of the
most uniquely crucial factors in business relationships and networks in
China; these relationships are successful and sustainable where
entrepreneurs have extensive networks of connections with senior
government officials. At its essence, it involves building, maintaining, and
expanding deep, private, and complicated interpersonal relationships and
bonds between individuals based on mutual trust, respect, and sometimes
mutual interests.
One study of guanxi in the late 1990s found that managers in China
were divided as to whether they felt that guanxi was decreasing in
importance.81 As for the relationship between corporate performance and
guanxi, Law, Tse, and Zhou argue that the role of guanxi declined in
relationship to Chinese companies’ increased performance. 82 With
globalization of the Chinese economy and the country’s accession to the
World Trade Organization, it is questionable whether guanxi still matters in
relation to doing business in China. But, looking at the historical
development and recent social and economic transformation in China, it
appears that guanxi is still deeply rooted there, just as is Confucian
philosophy, and it will likely remain so indefinitely.83
B. OTHERRELATEDCULTURALDERIVATIVES
Other cultural derivatives from guanxi include factors such as renqing,
which means gaining advantages from a relationship. If we look at “ren”
and “qing” as two separate words, we find that ren means “people/humans”
and qing means “feelings.” Therefore, the direct translation of renqing is
human feelings. Related to these human feelings, the concept of renqing is
about reciprocity in established relationships, and it is obviously closely
related to the gift giving and guanxi culture in China. This means that
renqing constitutes the favors that are offered through well-regarded
79. See generally Ricky Szeto, Philip C. Wright & Edward Cheng, Business Networking in the
Chinese Context: Its Role in the Formation of Guanxi, Social Capital and Ethical Foundations, 29
MGMT. RES. NEWS 425 (2006).
80. MIN CHEN, ASIANMANAGEMENT SYSTEMS 45 (2d ed. 2004).
81. Douglas Guthrie, The Declining Significance of Guanxi in China’s Economic Transition,
154 CHINAQ. 254, 264–65 (1998).
82. See generally Kenneth S. Law, David K. Tse & Nan Zhou, Does Human Resource
Management Matter in an Emerging Economy? The Example of the PRC, 34 J. INT’L BUS. STUD.
255 (2003).
83. See John H. Dunning & Changsu Kim, The Cultural Roots of Guanxi: An Exploratory
Study, 30 WORLD ECON. 329 (2007); Chao C. Chen, Xiao-Ping Chen & Shengsheng Huang,
Chinese Guanxi: An Integrative Review and New Directions for Future Research, 9 MGMT. &
ORG. REV. 167, 199 (2013).
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guanxi. Renqing is regarded as investment for social capital, with the
expectation that the beneficiary will remember it and pay it back when the
benefactor is in need. There are unspoken assumptions that both parties
have based a relationship on mutual trust and common understanding,84 and
this recognition provides credentials that entitle people to various kinds of
credit. In terms of renqing as unpaid obligations resulting from invoking a
guanxi relationship, reciprocity obligations are also formed by the
hierarchically structured guanxi. 85 Therefore, “the personal investment
required to develop and maintain good social relations is accepted as an
unavoidable fact of life,”86 achieved through interpersonal accommodation
and negotiation. Renqing is regarded as a key form of social capital that
obliges people and companies to reciprocate through guanxi networks.
The concept of guanxi is also closely related to the gift giving culture in
China, since giving and receiving gifts appropriately is vital in building and
sustaining guanxi. Knowing how to give and how to receive gifts is critical
in building and sustaining relationships, while each gift carries a piece of
renqing and all “accounts” are kept carefully and strictly. Favors and
obligations are weighed prudently and accordingly.87 Through interacting
and exchanging favors, individuals and business organizations build
credibility and establish trust, gradually creating more useful guanxi that
will normally be mutually beneficial for both parties.
The balance owed via the reciprocity principle by way of renqing is
normally silently recorded on both sides, and may be discharged in various
ways. Parties who do not fulfil their obligations are considered disloyal and
dishonest, and will suffer loss of moral and social face (mianzi).88 Renqing
can be interpreted as feelings that are found within friendship, family, and
kin relationships with regard to favors, etiquette, and customs. 89
Furthermore, mianzi provides the leverage one needs to successfully expand
and manipulate a guanxi network.90 Not losing face and the saving of others
are key components for cultivating a sustainable guanxi network. Xinren
84. Wenshan Jia, The Wei (Positioning) – Ming (Naming) – Lianmian (Face) – Guanxi
(Relationship) – Renqing (Humanized Feelings) Complex in Contemporary Chinese Culture, in
CONFUCIAN CULTURES OFAUTHORITY 49 (Peter D. Hershock & Roger T. Ames eds., 2006).
85. KWANG-KUO HWANG & XIANJIN HU, MIANZI POWER GAME OF CHINESE PEOPLE 2–3
(2004).
86. Jilong Zhang & Nattavud Pimpa, Embracing Guanxi: The Literature Review, 1 INT’L J.
ASIAN BUS. & INFO. MGMT. 23, 25 (2010).
87. Heidi von Weltzien Hoivik, East Meets West: Tacit Message About Business Ethics in
Stories Told by Chinese Managers, 74 J. BUS. ETHICS 457, 460–64 (2007).
88. For discussion of mianzi and its relationship with guanxi and renqing see generally
Kwang-Kuo Hwang, Face and Favor: The Chinese Power Game, 92 AM. J. SOC. 944 (1987);
WENSHAN JIA, THE REMAKING OF THE CHINESE CHARACTER AND IDENTITY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY: THE CHINESE FACE PRACTICES (2001).
89. Susanne Ruehle, Guanxi as Competitive Advantages During Economic Crises: Evidence
from China during the Recent Financial Crisis, in CHINA’S ROLE IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC
RECOVERY 60 (Xiaolan Fu ed., 2012).
90. LUO, supra note 74, at 29.
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(trust) is regarded as an important element in dynamic guanxi because it
limits the possibilities of opportunistic behavior in a business environment
that lacks established rules of law or sound law enforcement. In China,
these elements are generally important in life and they are major aspects of
Chinese commercial life.91
One of the positive aspects of guanxi is conceivably that it will
engender greater trust in the corporate governance system, in that
relationships have been developed and individuals and groups might feel
that they can trust others more.
C. CORPORATEGOVERNANCE INCHINA: AN IMMATUREMODEL
ENRICHED AND SUPPORTED BYGUANXI AND ITSDERIVATIVES
It is important to discuss the board structure and characteristics of
corporate governance in China before we can critically address the
relationship between corporate governance, accountability, and cultural
factors such as guanxi. Besides having a management board of directors, a
limited liability company in China is required by the Company Law 2005 to
have a supervisory board composed of no less than three members,92 who
are to supervise “the acts of the directors and senior executives performing
their functions.”93 The composition of the supervisory board should include
shareholders’ representatives, who are elected by the shareholders at the
general meeting, and by an appropriate percentage of employee
representatives, so that the employees of the company democratically elect
at least one third of the supervisory board.94
Thus, China has adopted a two-tier board system that is similar to the
German insider model.95 The membership of the supervisory board must
include representatives of the staff and workers of the company. 96 For
SOEs, the Communist Party (the Party) normally appoints the top
executives. 97 Apart from their directorship position, the top executives
normally have an official title within and endorsed by government, at a
level that matches their company’s position. Many of them return to
government positions after a stint as executives. In SOEs, members of the
supervisory board are civil servants, and despite the fact that there has been
91. John H. Dunning & Changsu Kim, The Cultural Roots of Guanxi: An Exploratory Study,
30 WORLD ECON. 329, 329 (2007).
92. COMPANY LAW OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 52 (2005) [hereinafter
COMPANY LAW].
93. Id. art. 54(2) (The supervisory board, as an independent board, offers independent opinions
on corporate decisions and monitors the directors’ executive management, while the board of
directors makes the main decisions on the day-to-day operations of the company).
94. Id. art. 52.
95. CTR. FOR FIN. MKT. INTEGRITY, CHINACORPORATEGOVERNANCE SURVEY 8 (2007).
96. COMPANY LAW, supra note 92, arts. 45, 109.
97. See Andrew G. Walder, From Control to Ownership: China’s Managerial Revolution, 7
MGMT. & ORG. REV. 19, 31 (2009).
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improvement since 201098 in their education levels and qualifications, they
are normally lower than those of the directors on the management board.99
They also tend to have limited knowledge about the company itself.100
While the two-tier system is representative of the corporate governance
of many civil law systems,101 China has also adopted an element that is
found in most common law systems, which embrace a one-tier board
model—namely the appointment of independent directors.102 Independent
directors are to be independent from the listed company that employs them
and the company’s major shareholders. These are non-executive directors
who are there to hold the executive directors more accountable and to
undertake the supervisory aspect of the function of non-executive directors.
They are not able to hold any other position in the company apart from
independent director.103 The Corporate Governance Code provides that all
listed companies should have at least three independent directors. 104 An
98. WEIAN LI, CHINA’S CORPORATEGOVERNANCE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2014 178–79
(2014).
99. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE RESEARCH GROUP OF NAN-KAI UNIVERSITY, THE RESEARCH
REPORT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE EVALUATION OF CHINESE LISTED COMPANIES (中国上市
公司治理评价报告) (2005); see also Jay Dahya, Yusuf Karbhari, Jason Zezhong Xiao & Mei
Yang, The Usefulness of the Supervisory Board Report in China, 11 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L
REV. 308, 308 (2003).
100. Li Guo, Revisiting the Chinese Styled Board of Supervisors: How It Gets Failed?—An
International Comparative Perspective, 29 RES. COMP. L. (比较法研究) 74 (2016).
101. It is typically regarded as a characteristic of the German system. See generally John Kay,
Corporate Governance (with Aubrey Silberston), JOHN KAY (Aug. 31, 1996), https://www.
johnkay.com/1996/08/31/corporate-governance-with-aubrey-silberston/. The Aktiengesetz
mandates a two-tier board with supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and management board
(Vorstand). See AUFSICHTSRAT §§ 76, 100 (2010); see also MITBESTIMMUNGSGESETZ §§ 1, 7,
27, 31. Three co-determination regimes are currently enforced under current German Law
including co-determination pursuant to the Montan Co-Determination Act, co-determination
pursuant to the DrittelbG 2004 and co-determination under the Co-Determination Act 1976,
historically, voluntary formation of labour councils at the factory level by an amendment to
Business Practice Act in 1890 (Gewerbeordnung or GewO); Article 165 of the Weimar
Constitution of 1919 which guaranteed employees the right to cooperate with employers on an
equal basis in the regulation of wages and working conditions; and the Labour Management
Relationship Act 1952 (Betriebsverfassungsegesetz 1952 or BetrVG 1952) which introduced the
principle of one third representation of the management board for all other industries. See Gerhard
Cromme, Corporate Governance in German and the German Corporate Governance Code, 13
CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 362, 365 (2005); Marc Goergen, Miguel C. Manjoin Antolin &
Luc Renneboog, Corporate Governance in Germany, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ACCOUNTABILITY, ENTERPRISE AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 285 (Kevin Keasey, Steve
Thompson & Michael Wright eds., 2005).
102. Jeffery N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Price, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1465, 1468 (2007); for the
discussion on Chinese independent directors regime see generally Donald C. Clarke, The
Independent Directors in Chinese Corporate Governance, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 125 (2006).
103. CHINA SEC. REG. COMM’N, CODE OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE FOR LISTED COMPANIES
IN CHINA art. 49 (2001) [hereinafter CODE OFCORPORATEGOVERNANCE].
104. Id. art. 52.
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independent director should chair the audit committee, the nomination
committee, and the remuneration and appraisal committee.105
Just like other corporate governance models with a two-tier board, the
management board is accountable to the supervisory board in China.106 The
supervisory board of a listed company is accountable to all shareholders.107
Meanwhile, the board of directors is also accountable to the shareholders.108
Therefore, management boards are accountable to both shareholders and the
supervisory board, while the shareholders seem to be the parties that both
boards are accountable to as far as the corporate governance code and
company law is concerned. 109 Individual directors and managers of the
corporation are accountable to the management board. These relationships
will be taken into account in the next part of the Article.
Guanxi and other cultural derivatives are obviously closely related to
the notions of reciprocity, obligation, indebtedness, and trust, and they are
essential for personal relationships in China. The concentric guanxi circle is
established through renqing, gift giving, and xinren by inventing and re-
inventing relationships in an ongoing process of social engineering.110 It has
been argued that guanxi is a mixture of “ganqing” (sentiments) and
renqing, while renqing is the precondition for establishing guanxi and
provides a moral foundation for the reciprocity and equity that are implicit
in all guanxi relationships. 111 The traditional Chinese social culture
surrounding business practices, including the key roles of guanxi and
renqing, still plays a significant role in the remarkable recent growth of the
Chinese economy and in increasing cross-border business opportunities.
Logically, guanxi and other cultural derivatives will also have an impact on
the relationship between the two boards, independent directors, and the
shareholders to whom they are all accountable.
Many scholars have viewed the interaction between guanxi and its
derivatives, as in other collectivist cultures, as an idiosyncratic cultural
phenomenon within which Confucianism is the major life philosophy.112
Personal relationships have always played a key role in the process of
business transactions in China in initiating, negotiating, and closing a deal.
It is a matter of trust and reliance on networking opportunities, and the
105. Id. art. 52.
106. Alice Belcher & Till Naruisch, The Evolution of Business Knowledge in the Context of
Unitary and Two-Tier Board Systems, J. BUS. L. 443, 451 (2005).
107. CODE OFCORPORATEGOVERNANCE, supra note 103, art. 59.
108. Id. art. 42.
109. See COMPANY LAW, supra note 92, art. 47.
110. See generally Ambrose Yeo-chi King, Kuan-his and Network Building, 120 DAEDALUS 69
(1991); see also Jar-Der Luo & Yung-Ch. Yeh, Neither Collectism nor Individualism: Trust in the
Chinese Guanxi Circle, 2 J. TR. RES. 53 (2012).
111. LUO, supra note 74, at 15.
112. Dong-Jin, Pae & Wong, supra note 73, at 53; see generally MAYFAIR MEI-HUI YANG,
GIFT FAVORS AND BANQUETS: THE ART OF SOCIALRELATIONSHIPS IN CHINA (1994).
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maintenance of well-established relationships.113 One interesting feature of
guanxi is that the exchange of favors tends to benefit the weaker side, which
usually expects to receive more help than he or she can reciprocate.114 This
unequal exchange “reflects the Confucian principle of family loyalty, in
which family ties demand the exchange of aid.”115 Therefore, it may be
worth considering the parties that are comparatively weaker in the scenario
of accountability within the corporate governance framework. These parties
could be at a disadvantage or in positions of vulnerability, especially when
we are discussing guanxi in the context of accountability.
It is our task in this section to determine whether China’s social and
cultural traditions, including guanxi, will continue to influence the
development of Chinese corporate governance, in particular, where they fit
in relation to the wenze system of accountability. The Chinese corporate
governance system currently in place owes a lot to the longstanding and
deeply held Chinese value of upholding the importance of flexibility, which
allows for a certain amount of freedom for directors in the course of their
decision-making.116 Within corporate governance this is described as “low
structure, high ambiguity,” in which the ambiguity allows for culture,
traditions, and values to decide what is fair and what is right for
corporations. 117 The higher degree of autonomy and ambiguity allow
culture to play a greater role. Preferences and interpretations of culture are
permitted to interfere with corporate governance.
It is also argued that culture is an amorphous concept, which is
“difficult to define, [and yet] absolutely fundamental.”118 In many places in
China the government and the Party still play an important role in
governing and interfering in corporate decisions, so that the existing culture
may need to play a greater role in corporate governance. For example, the
guanxi between the civil servants who represent the state or a state agency
and shareholders and stakeholders are particularly important in a society
that exhibits high levels of collectivism and the avoidance of uncertainty.119
113. Angus Young, Conceptualising a Chinese Corporate Governance Framework: Tension
between Tradition, Ideologies and Modernity, 20 INT’L COMPANY & COM. L. REV. 235, 237
(2009).
114. CHEN, supra note 80, at 44.
115. John P. Alston, Wa, Guanxi, and Inhwa: Managerial Principle in Japan, China, and
Korea, 32 BUS. HORIZON 26, 28 (1989).
116. S.H. Goo & Anne Carve, Low Structure, High Ambiguity: Selective Adaptation of
International Norms of Corporate Governance Mechanisms in China, in CHANGING CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN CHINA AND JAPAN: ADAPTATIONS OF ANGLO-AMERICAN PRACTICES 206, 207
(Masao Nakamura ed., 2008).
117. Id.
118. Michel Lebas & Jane Weigenstein, Management Control: The Roles of Rules, Markets and
Culture, 23 J. MGMT. STUD. 259, 264 (1986).
119. David Hay, Shayuti Mohamed Adnan & Chris van Staden, Do Culture and Governance
Structure Influence CSR Reporting Quality: Evidence from China, India, Malaysia and the United
Kingdom (Paper presented at the 2010 Asia Pacific Interdisciplinary Research in Accounting
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It is crucial to point out that the essence of guanxi must be cultivated over
time, and the process of establishing guanxi is the process of exchanging
renqing, gift giving, and establishing xinren. While contracts are regarded
as the core legal documents in the Western business world, cultural
elements play a rudimentary role in China in the process of reaching
business agreements. Discussions of these cultural issues are particularly
important in corporate governance since these issues serve as a form of
insurance in a relatively risky business environment. 120 While the
enforcement of law is relatively weak and the involvement of government is
comparatively strong in China, having guanxi with suppliers, banks,
government supervisory agencies, retailers, and customers could help
tremendously by offering them a number of benefits.
IV. DO GUANXI AND OTHER CULTURAL DERIVATIVES
HINDER OR ENHANCE ACCOUNTABILITY IN CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE IN CHINA?
A. NECESSITY AND THE ETHICS OFGUANXI
Before discussing the impact of guanxi and other cultural issues on
accountability in Chinese corporate governance, it is necessary to discuss
the ethical aspects of the terms themselves. A consensus has not yet been
reached regarding certain ethical aspects of guanxi. Some commentators
hold the opinion that it is an ethical concept, generating trust between, and
dependence on, individuals in commercial transactions, allowing mutual
understanding to facilitate the exchange of favors and product adaptation.121
Guanxi provides boards of directors with access to scarce information,
resources, and influence.122 It is argued by McNally et al., that informal
networks still act as a key component in companies’ success, despite the
stronger formalization of private sector institutions. 123 While the market
depends on an elaborate legal system to enforce contracts in Western
society, the Chinese system depends on reputation and trust, and
transactions take place within flexible but permanent networks
Conference, Sydney, Australia), http://apira2010.econ.usyd.edu.au/conference_proceedings/APIR
A-2010-271-Adnan-Do-culture-and-governance-structure-influence-CSR-reporting-quality.pdf.
120. Roy Yong-Joo Chua & Michael W. Morris, Dynamics of Trust in Guanxi Networks, in
NATIONALCULTURE AND GROUPS 95, 98 (Yaru Chen ed., 2006).
121. See generally James A. Brunner, Jiwei Chen, Chao Sun & Nanping Zhou, The Role of
Guanxi in Negotiation in the Pacific Basin, 32 J. GLOBAL MARKETING 374, 382–86 (1989); E.
Alan Buttery & Y.H. Wong, The Difference between Chinese and Western Negotiations, 17
MARKETING INTELLIGENCE& PLAN. 147 (1999).
122. Anne S. Tsui, Jiing-Lih Farh & Katherine R Xin, Guanxi in the Chinese Context, in
MANAGEMENT AND ORGANIZATIONS IN THE CHINESE CONTEXT 225 (J.T. Li, Anne S. Tsui &
Elizabeth Weldon eds., 2000).
123. Christopher A. McNally, Hong Guo & Guangwei Hu, Entrepreneurship and Political
Guanxi Network in China’s Private Sector 15–17 (East-West Centre Working Papers, Paper No.
19, 2007).
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characterized by long-term relationships, especially for small and medium-
sized enterprises.124 Guanxi assumes some of the functions of a legal system
and is regarded as a code of conduct that is a substitute for the rule of
law.125 It is claimed that in an era of financial crisis, more credit should be
given to guanxi capitalism due to the importance and effectiveness of the
persona of the entrepreneur embedded in his or her network. Guanxi is not
only a powerful instrument to overcome the challenges of a transformative
economy, but also allows the entrepreneur to be adaptable and powerful in
times of financial crisis, when networks are often more sustainable and
reliable than actual enterprises.126
While the Western model assumes predictability with explicit remedies,
clear exceptions to the rule, and a reliance on common law to complement
the inadequacies of statutes, a guanxi-based business strategy has a
profound and favorable impact on market performance through the positive
function of good and functional guanxi. The logic of relationships and
business performance differs in China when compared with Western
countries, since the Chinese build relationships, and transactions and
projects will benefit and develop based on good relationships, whereas
Westerners believe that relationships will grow from building successful
transactions. Guanxi and other cultural issues have helped corporations and
business people within this close network to overcome institutional barriers
and instability in order to confront regulatory changes in countries with
emerging markets. However, others suggest that negotiators cultivate
guanxi as an unnecessary and unethical transaction cost.127
There is an apparent contradiction between the openness of Chinese
corporate governance and the strong culture of behavior among Chinese
directors and strategic management policies in practice. These cultural
aspects of Chinese society are arguably more focused on informal relations,
such as non-normative agreements. These informal networks facilitate
business relationships, but do sometimes limit the system’s capacity to
grow. They facilitate business transactions particularly within an uncertain
business environment and an inadequate legal system. Therefore,
cultivating guanxi may circumscribe entrepreneurs’ objectives of
maximizing profits. These foci may cause these informal factors to prevail
in the face of systematic changes. Flexibility and swift reactions in a
network based on trust and reciprocity may also limit the efficient
124. Susanne Ruehle, Guanxi as Competitive Advantages During Economic Crises: Evidence
from China during the Recent Financial Crisis, in CHINA’S ROLE IN GLOBAL ECONOMIC
RECOVERY 60, 64 (Xiaolan Fu ed., 2012).
125. HAROLD CHEE&CHRISWEST, MYTHSABOUTDOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 63 (2004).
126. Ruehle, supra note 89, 60–61.
127. See generally T.K.P. Leung & Y.H. Wong, The Ethics and Positioning of Guanxi in
China, 19 MARKETING INTELLIGENCE& PLAN. 55 (2001).
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functioning of the legal system, because there will be fewer flexible rules
and principles to be applied.
B. TYPES OFGUANXI
Before looking at the impact that cultural issues have, in detail, it is
important to identify the different guanxi that could be cultivated. Guanxi is
embedded in most functions of everyday life, such as political alliances,
recreation, and economic activity. 128 It is argued by Fan that there are
normally three types of guanxi, defined as: PtP guanxi (people to people),
BtB guanxi (business to business), and BtG guanxi (business to
government). 129 Various types of guanxi within the Chinese corporate
governance regime could also fit into these three types of guanxi. In detail,
the most commonly considered types include guanxi between shareholders
(PtP), especially affecting institutional shareholders and individual
shareholders), between corporations and government or government
agencies and bureaucrats (BtG), between corporations and suppliers (BtB),
between corporations and their competitors (BtB), between boards of
directors and shareholders (PtP), and between boards of directors,
independent directors, executives, managers, and supervisory boards (PtP).
C. GUANXI AND THEWENZE SYSTEM
Guanxi and other cultural issues are pertinent to many aspects of
corporate governance and they will be closely related to every stage of the
wenze system, including information discourse, explanation, justification,
and the enquiry process. In the following discussion, we reference the
stages that we identified in Part II for accountability in corporate
governance and try to clarify the impact of guanxi on accountability at each
of these stages. While we accept that accountability as defined in relation to
Anglo-American systems does not map completely onto the Chinese
position, we argue that the wenze system, as we have envisaged it, is close
to the Anglo-American systems, and might well become even closer as
Chinese corporate governance moves from having an
administrative/economic hybrid model to something that is nearer to a full
economic model. Based on discussions of the nature and scope of the wenze
system, both positive and negative aspects of these cultural issues will be
critically discussed in the following section. We use the stages of
accountability identified earlier in relation to Anglo-American corporate
governance as the basis for the discussion.
128. MARCEL MAUSS, THE GIFT: THE FORM AND REASON FOR EXCHANGE IN ARCHAIC
SOCIETIES 1–3 (1966).
129. Ying Fan, Questioning Guanxi: Definition, Classification and Implications, 11 INT’L BUS.
REV. 543, 550–51 (2002).
400 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 11
1. First Stage: The Provision of Accurate Information
Concerning Decisions Made and Actions Taken (Stage of
Mingze)
The first stage of accountability requires the provision of accurate
information concerning decisions and actions, and the nature of guanxi may
hinder the accuracy of the information provided. Where this information
comes from the management board, supervisory boards might not be able to
detect this information or may not wish to do so. However, there is also the
possibility of a positive impact of guanxi in terms of disclosing accurate or
useful information if there is guanxi between the management and
supervisory boards, because the members of the former will not want to
withhold anything that might potentially place the latter in a position of
embarrassment.
There is the possibility that because of guanxi the management board
might be willing to accept reports and details from individual directors and
managers that are not as comprehensive or as rigorous as would be
normally expected. The same might be said about the supervisory board’s
acceptance of reports from the management board. In such a case, the
accounting may be compromised to some degree.
Guanxi could enhance accountability at this stage by enabling
companies to gain access to more diverse and highly valued information,
and it is likely to be at a relatively lower cost.130 Furthermore, if guanxi can
be regarded as a substitute for formal institutional support, as it often is,131 it
might be used to provide access to resources that are normally not directly
available to the shareholders and to the public;132 it can be regarded as a
semi-formal way of getting the information needed instead of requiring the
fulfilment of legal obligations.133 Guanxi might be regarded as a rational
response to the lack of strong, formal institutions in China.134 This might in
fact provide management boards and supervisory boards with more
130. Ronald S. Burt, The Contingent Value of Social Capital, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 339, 340
(1997).
131. See e.g., Nancy Yi-feng Chen & Dean Tjosvold, Guanxi and Leader-member
Relationships between American Managers and Chinese Employees: Open-minded Dialogue as
Mediator, 24 ASIA PAC. J. MGMT. 171, 181–82 (2007); John H. Dunning & Changsu Kim, The
Cultural Roots of Guanxi: An Exploratory Study, 30 WORLD ECON. 329, 333–34 (2007); Xin &
Pearce, supra note 67, at 1641–42.
132. See Mike W. Peng, Firm Growth in Transitional Economies: Three Longitudinal Cases
from China, 1989–96, 18 ORG. STUD. 385, 398–400 (1997); Xin & Pearce, supra note 67, at
1641–42.
133. It is said that this can occur at the expense of the interests and rights of others not covered
by the guanxi. See Ying Fan, Guanxi’s Consequences: Personal Gains at Social Cost, 38 J. BUS.
ETHICS 371, 377–78 (2002).
134. Nolan Sharkey, The Economic Benefits of the Use of Guanxi and Business Networks in a
Jurisdiction with Strong Formal Institutions: Minimisation of Taxation, 6 J. TAX RES. 45, 49
(2008); Douglas Guthrie, The Declining Significance of Guanxi in China’s Economic Transition,
154 CHINAQ. 254, 257 (1998).
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information than would normally be available through formal processes,
which reduces the vulnerability of company stakeholders. Interpersonal and
inter-organizational dynamics will enable shareholders, institutional
shareholders, and other constituencies to access the information more
quickly and efficiently, and in a customized form. Access to information is
not only essential for companies, but also for stakeholders, particularly
those in a disadvantaged position, such as minority shareholders or foreign
investors, provided that the scattered information can be decoded in a more
organized manner as far as it relates to the company’s profile and
performance. Therefore, the board of directors will have the ability to
anticipate and prepare for responding to queries that are based on the
information disclosed.
For SOEs, the concentrated ownership that exists could impede the
development of high quality information disclosure because of BtG guanxi
and the way that government and its agencies are able to directly obtain
information from entities, partly because of guanxi. The information benefit
to individuals that is provided by guanxi could be critical for shareholders
and other stakeholders as a strategic element in gaining an edge over their
competitors. However, the advantages brought by guanxi might place
minority shareholders, who already suffer from high levels of information
asymmetry,135 in a disadvantageous position. This is due to the complicated
social relationships between controlling shareholders and local government,
and the guanxi between controlling shareholders and boards. It might not be
fair for minority shareholders, who may not have effective access to the
information; they are likely, for the most part, to be limited to the
information already available to the public.136
The fundamental logic behind the voting system is the principle that the
parties that have a claim to the residual benefit of the company and who
also assume the greatest risk should be offered rights to enable them to
exact some control.137 This is normally achieved through voting rights for
shareholders. Due to the fact that minority shareholders’ rights to
information and inspection are limited, partly due to the negative impact of
guanxi and other related cultural factors, this may logically have a negative
impact on the voting system in China. Decision-making in the shareholders’
general meeting is dominated by capital rather than by heads/hands and the
default rule is that the amount of voting rights exercisable by shareholders
135. See Sun Liu, Corporate Governance and Forward-Looking Disclosure: Evidence from
China, 25 J. INT’LACCT. AUDITING&TAX’N 16, 17–18 (2015).
136. We are not envisaging information that could be used by parties to engage in insider
dealing.
137. See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Case for Limited Shareholder Voting Right, 53
UCLA L. REV. 601 (2006); Daniel Attenborough, The Vacuous Concept of Shareholder Voting
Rights, 14 EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. 147 (2013)
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at a meeting is based on the percentage of capital contribution.138 Those
shareholders without guanxi are disadvantaged due to lack of information
and knowledge concerning the company’s performance and strategy.
The existence of guanxi might lead to less questioning of the validity
and reliability of information provided. The reason is that it is necessary for
a person to show respect for the feelings of seniors or give face (mianzi) to
people with seniority, those who have established friendships or guanxi
with him or her, or people to whom one owes renqing, and it may mean the
board fails to quiz a director or a manager sufficiently about what he or she
has been doing. These cultural issues have a huge impact on various
interactions between people, groups of people, and organizations.139 It is
inevitable that members of supervisory boards and independent directors
will not enquire about information that might put the chief executive officer
(CEO) or the chairman of the board of directors in an embarrassing or
awkward position.
Apart from guanxi between independent directors and members of the
executive board, guanxi between the members of the supervisory board and
the management board also has the potential to limit the scope and nature of
information disclosed to the members of the supervisory board. The guanxi
between members of the management board and the controlling
shareholders and employees on the supervisory board could restrict the
disclosure of useful or controversial information in the context of further
enquiries. Just as the management board might not quiz individual directors
(or managers) adequately about what they have done or not done, so the
supervisory board might not make sufficient enquiry of the management
board as to what it has reported. The shareholders’ representatives on the
supervisory board may want to establish better guanxi with members of the
management board and therefore choose not to challenge them or require
additional information beyond what either has been provided or is available
to the public. They may also think that leaving these “prohibited” or
sensitive areas unexplored may win some renqing from the members of the
management board, so that they will benefit in the long run.
A possible drawback is the fact that a person who owes guanxi to
another would not normally disclose information that would cause the other
to be shamed, and thus lose face. Therefore, in a corporate context a board
might refrain from conveying information that would in some actual or
potential way harm the position of a person to whom guanxi is owed. Also,
as collectivism is, arguably, an element of guanxi, a Confucian concept that
138. COMPANY LAW, supra note 92, art. 42. Also, Limited Liability Companies can change
voting rules in the company’s constitutional document. Id. art. 41.
139. CAOBIN XIE, A STUDY OF THE INDEPENDENT DIRECTOR SYSTEM (独立董事法律制度研
究)319–320 (2004).
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involves the group being paramount to the individual,140 members of the
board might be persuaded, out of loyalty to the group, not to disclose
certain details that might cause embarrassment for the board as a whole.
From an instrumental point of view, guanxi, mianzi, and renqing may
entitle accountees to “resort to guanxi networks to bridge the gaps [that
exist] in the formal institutions to obtain crucial information and valuable
resources.”141 It is argued that guanxi networks provide “secret, exclusive,
and safe channels of communication for officials to disclose crucial
information,”142 but the accountees may need to offer significant renqing in
the form of economic or non-economic benefits in exchange.143 Therefore,
accountees could get the necessary, useful, and tailored information in an
informal and efficient manner through guanxi networks, although this may
contradict principles of transparency and fairness, which are, along with
accountability, described as fundamental corporate governance principles
by the G20/OECD.144 This may also lead to corruption.
2. Second and Third Stages: Justification and Explanation
Followed by Questioning and Evaluation (Stage of Jinze and
NarrowWenze)
Within the wenze system, 145 the second and third stages involve
accountors explaining and justifying their decisions, followed by the
questioning and evaluation of the reasons for what has been done or not
done. It is indeed very likely that cultural issues including those centered on
guanxi will also have an impact on these two processes. Consideration of
these issues is reliant on information disclosure, for without valid, accurate,
and comprehensible information, as discussed, the entire process of enquiry
would be useless and pointless, and “monitoring could be extremely
ineffective.”146
Like information disclosure, the explaining, questioning, and evaluating
process is also limited by guanxi-centered cultural factors. The explanation
of what individual directors and managers, as well as the respective boards
of directors, have done could be limited by the amount of information that
has been disclosed, so that if little information were disclosed then that
would require less explanation. But on the other side of the coin, if there
were guanxi between the managers and the management board and between
140. John H. Dunning & Changsu Kim, The Cultural Roots of Guanxi: An Exploratory Study,
30 WORLD ECON. 329, 332 (2007).
141. Jing Vivian Zhan, Filling the Gap of Formal Institutions: The Effects of Guanxi Network
on Corruption in Reform-era China, 58 CRIME L. & SOC. CHANGE 93, 94 (2012).
142. Id. at 106.
143. Szeto, Wright & Cheng, supra note 79, at 426.
144. Zhan, supra note 141, at 106.
145. Keay & Zhao, supra note 13, at 698–99.
146. Enrichetta Ravina & Paola Sapienza, What Do Independent Directors Know: Evidence
from Their Trading, 23 REV. FIN. STUD. 962, 963 (2010).
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the two boards, and more information were disclosed than might ordinarily
be expected, then any explanations would, normally, be greater and that
would enhance accountability. In other words, because guanxi could affect
disclosure of material, there might be a knock-on effect as far as these
second and third stages are concerned. That is, if guanxi causes the
management board to fail to disclose particular information to the
supervisory board or the shareholders, it will mean that the directors will
not justify their decisions relating to matters covered by that information
and, perhaps more importantly, the accountees will not have a chance to
question what the directors have done. This chain reaction effect from
guanxi could produce negative effects as far as accountability in corporate
governance is concerned.
It is possible that at times management boards, for example, might be
caught between two competing obligations, namely to honor guanxi on the
one hand and to account fully to the supervisory board and shareholders on
the other. Perhaps it can be said that as boards may be subject to
consequences if they fail to account appropriately, board members are not
going to let guanxi get in the way of providing information to the
supervisory board and the shareholders. That might be too simplistic a
view, however, for if everyone keeps quiet the issue that might be
embarrassing does not get aired, and this may hamper the accountability
process.
Independent outsiders and supervising insiders look at corporate
decisions subject to the predetermined direction of the CEO.147 It is often
the case in China that the dominant CEO may tap into a guanxi network
when selecting directors. The guanxi between selected members of the
board, independent directors, and the CEO, and consideration of the mianzi
of the CEO, are likely to make the questioning and evaluation processes
less robust. Furthermore, independent directors on a board, who are
employed independently by a corporation, may not in fact be independent,
and investors need to undertake due diligence in evaluating individuals’
current directorships and directors’ historical ties, including former board
members’ links and overlaps in terms of schools and universities attended,
and places of birth (so-called laoxiang culture, which is related to
guanxi).148
As a result of this guanxi, many independent directors do not use the
regulatory tools granted by the law, such as proxy contests, employing
147. Shaopin Yin, Some Thoughts on Independent Directors (关于独立董事制度的思考),
CHINA SECURITIESDAILY (中国证券报) 16 (2001).
148. Smith, supra note 57, at 6–7; see generally Jane Nolan, Good Guanxi, Bad Guanxi:
Western Bankers and the Role of Network Practices in Institutional Change in China, 22 INT’L J.
HUMAN RESOURCE MGMT. 3357 (2011). For discussions on laoxiang (native ethnic group
identity) culture, see Haizhong Zhang & Yongzhi Jiang, A Cross-Cultural Psychological Analysis
of the Chinese Concept of Laoxiang, 3 TRIB. EDUC. CULTURE 8 (2010).
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external independent auditors, or direct communication with employees in
order to supervise the board of directors more effectively and to promote
accountability. 149 While employees’ representatives within supervisory
boards are fully aware that managerial ties may not always guarantee their
career success, their absence usually leads to failure and independent
directors are clear about the massive influence that the management board
has on appointment to, and removal from, their positions.150 The guanxi
between the members of the board of directors who are required to explain
and justify their decisions can make accountability less meaningful and
effective.
A major issue that is likely to exist while accountees are enquiring and
questioning is that the accountees may consider and be concerned about
maintaining guanxi with, and mianzi for, the accountor. For instance, out of
respect and to avoid any shame that might result from publicly disclosing
the flaws or failures of Chinese CEOs, who have super-sensitive radars for
mianzi, the accountees may not engage in detailed or extensive questioning
about what the accountor has done. Wang has argued that independent
directors in China are more accurately defined as “vase directors”
(appointed for show only), “guanxi directors,” or “renqing directors” when
it comes to having to explain and justify their actions and decisions.151 The
appointment of directors and the relative influence of independent directors
are closely related to the guanxi network of the executive directors and
controlling shareholders. Their independence and ability to resist undue
influence from other parties is seriously limited by these cultural issues, and
hence their ability and/or willingness to engage in the evaluation process is
likely to be seriously limited.
However, looking at the positive and instrumental effects of guanxi, it
is also undeniable that independent directors who know with whom, when,
and how to create ties with the government, suppliers, and competitors add
considerable value to corporations, and the appointment of independent
directors with good guanxi networks is more likely to lead to better
corporate performance. Guanxi between the accountee and the accountor
may also make informal enquiries and the questioning process more useful
and efficient. Discussions and developments could be accomplished around
the dinner table in a harmonious manner and without conflict. It is easier, in
this atmosphere, to reach agreement and maintain a more sustainable
relationship between directors, independent directors, and representatives of
149. See Yonghui You, Coordination and Perfection Between Independent Directors and
Supervisor’s Council, 1 J. POL. & L. 61, 64 (2008).
150. Jinsong Tan, A Study on Independence of Independent Directors, 10 CHINA INDUS. ECON.
(中国工业经济) 64 (2003); Wei Cai, The Dilemmas of Independent Directors in China: An
Empirical and Comparative Study, EUR. BUS. ORG. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2758519.
151. TIANXIWANG, RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INDEPENDENT
DIRECTORS (公司治理与独立董事研究) 129 (2005).
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the shareholders and employees. The complementary relationships that
emanate from the guanxi network compared with stricter practice in law are
regarded as positive aspects of guanxi. This involves taking advantage of
the flexibility offered by guanxi to promote more harmonious and
sustainable business relationships.152 Furthermore, by engaging in a united,
personalized, and reciprocal guanxi network, the decision makers could
respond to queries in a more timely and effective manner, and guanxi could
improve the efficacy of the justification stage.
3. Fourth Stage: Imposition of Consequences (Stage of Baoze
or Chengze)
While the consequences of accounting are not necessarily negative, as
accountees might praise and affirm the work of the accountors or provide
feedback that will enrich the personal and working lives of the
accountors,153 the consequences of accounting are often seen as negative.
Examples are the censuring or removal of directors. Despite the fact that
consequences may have a negative flavor and involve formal or informal
sanctions154 or a requirement to make reparations,155 this process is closely
related to law enforcement. It is argued that the position of guanxi is always
regarded as operating in juxtaposition to the role of law and legal
institutions, 156 and guanxi may undermine and distort China’s legal
framework and make the judicial system in China ineffective. For example,
the legitimate positions of foreign investors have been questioned due to the
lack of guanxi, the lack of capacity to establish guanxi, or the failure to
understand the significance of guanxi. Guanxi also facilitates the continuing
dominant role of the state and the government in Chinese corporate
governance and corporate law, which may hinder their functioning
efficiently.
Furthermore, guanxi may also make aspects of the imported legal
system of Europe or North America difficult to enforce fully without
adaption.157 As a result, it may facilitate the rise of extra-legal protections,
152. See generally Xin & Pearce, supra note 67.
153. KEAY, supra note 10, at 104–07.
154. Carol Harlow & Richard Rawlings, Promoting Accountability in Multilevel Governance: A
Network Approach 4 (European Governance Papers, Paper No. C-06-02, 2007), http://edoc.vifapol
.de/opus/volltexte/2011/2461/pdf/egp_connex_C_06_02.pdf.
155. Id.
156. See generally Jose Tomas Gomez Arias, A Relationship Marketing Approach to Guanxi,
32 EUR. J. MARKETING 145 (1998).
157. See Pitman B. Potter, The Chinese Legal System: Continuing Commitment to the Primacy
of State Power, 159 CHINA Q. 673, 673–74 (1999); see also Jianfu Chen, Modernisation,
Westernisation, and Globalisation: Legal Transplant in China, in ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS,
THREE LEGALORDERS - PERSPECTIVES OF EVOLUTION 91 (Jorge Oliveira & Paulo Cardinal eds.,
2009).
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including private protection or quasi-law enforcement. 158 Therefore, the
consequences that flow from not being accountable may be softened or may
even be non-existent due to guanxi between the accountor, the accountee,
and government officials. This lack of, or softened, enforcement will make
the accountee question whether enquiries and explanation processes are
necessary or worthless due to a lack of recognition of what the directors
have done or should not have done and a lack of consequences. It is also
argued that guanxi is a factor that facilitates the bribery of public officers
and promotes the formation of networks of corruption. 159 Connections
between corruption and guanxi have been broadly observed, 160 and the
absence of a reliable set of rules of law means that private companies are
subject to threatened interference and arbitrary extortion by Party and
government officials.161
It is argued that the dominance of state power in Chinese society and
the relative absence of formal institutional limits on state power continue to
militate in favor of guanxi relations.162 Less strict enforcement of law in
terms of the consequences resulting from the accountability process could
be beneficial, since more flexible enforcement allows the coexistence of
opposing viewpoints, especially when decisions made by a board of
directors are subjective, strategic, and normally difficult to challenge. The
existence of guanxi in China is attributed to the weakness in law
enforcement and can be regarded as a coping mechanism to promote better
accountability within the framework of corporate governance. It is
employed as a substitute for formal enforcement of accountability through
corporate law. Instead of sanctions, informal negotiation, discussion, or
consultation could be employed to avoid conflict between accountors and
accountees in order to create a more harmonious relationship. Guanxi and
158. Peng Wang, Extra-Legal Protection in China: How Guanxi Distorts China’s Legal System
and Facilitates the Rise of Unlawful Protectors, 54 BRITISH J. CRIMINOLOGY 809, 813 (2014); see
also AVINASH K. DIXIT, LAWLESSNESS AND ECONOMICS: ALTERNATIVE MODES OF
GOVERNANCE (2004).
159. See Thomas W. Dunfee & Danielle E. Warren, Is Guanxi Ethical? A Normative Analysis
of Doing Business in China, 32 J. BUS. ETHICS 191, 198, 200 (2001); see generally Yadong Luo,
The Changing Chinese Culture and Business Behavior: The Perspective of Intertwinement
between Guanxi and Corruption, 17 INT’LBUS. REV. 188 (2008).
160. See Ling Li, Performing Bribery in China: Guanxi-Practice, Corruption with a Human
Face, 20 J. CONTEMP. CHINA 1 (2011); Zhan, supra note 141, at 93; Alan Smart & Carolyn L.
Hsu, Corruption or Social Capital? Tact and the Performance of Guanxi in Market Socialist
China, in CORRUPTION AND THE SECRET OF LAW: A LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE
167 (Monique Nuijten & Gerhard Anders eds., 2007).
161. Xin & Pearce, supra note 67, at 1644–46; see also Xingqiao Du, Jianhua Guo & Yu Lei,
Political Connections and Corporate Performance of Private Listed Companies: Government
Intervention or Guanxi?, 353 J. FIN. RES. 158 (2009).
162. See generally Paul Bohannon, The Differing Realms of Law, 67 AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 33
(1965); P.B. Potter, Guanxi and the PRC Legal System: From Contradiction to Complementarity,
in SOCIAL CONNECTIONS IN CHINA: INSTITUTIONS, CULTURE AND THE CHANGING NATURE OF
GUANXI 180 (Thomas Gold, Doug Guthri & David Wank eds., 2002).
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the consequent respect for others could ensure that there is a constructive
and positive discussion of corporate issues.
From the discussions of guanxi and the four stages of accountability,
we identified that guanxi could have either a positive or negative impact on
the promotion of accountability. Positive values and negative problems
include the following aspects:
Positive Values Negative Problems
Diverse & comprehensible
information
Lower costs
Informal/Semi-formal support
Long-term coalitions
Draws on cultural ethics of
cooperation
Feasibility, substitute for regulation,
and compensates for poor
enforcement
Compromised degree of
rigorousness
Discrimination to vulnerable parties
Concerns of participants’ superiors
Independence of boards and
directors
Possibility of generating bribery
Undermines and distorts China’s
legal framework
In the next section, the positive aspects of guanxi will be discussed in
detail in order to demonstrate the relationship between those cultural issues
centered on guanxi on the one hand, and accountability on the other, in
order to identify the potential of applying guanxi so as to promote
accountability in corporate governance.
V. GUANXI AS A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE: LEGITIMATE,
CLEAN, AND SUSTAINABLE GUANXIWITHIN AWENZE
SYSTEM
The core of our initial question was: what are some of the culturally
specific and value-related barriers that make accountability in the context of
corporate governance challenging, and what can be done about it? We are
aware that Western approaches to corporate governance and accountability
do not necessarily function equally well in other cultures, unless those
approaches are reassessed and adapted. With the rapid economic
development of large-scale Westernized movements, such as culture,
intellectual property products, and systematic changes in developing
nations, including corporate governance model transformation and,
increasingly, globalization of the trade and financial markets in China, the
adoption of the notion of accountability in China should be effected in a
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unique manner, with cultural factors taken into account in order to assist the
development and enforcement of a wenze system.
Guanxi is a value based on Eastern principles, however it can be as
ethical as any Western system. 163 Guanxi and other related cultural
derivatives are increasingly being identified as complementary, rather than
as alternatives to formal institutions.164 Such core cultural issues still have a
massive impact on doing business in China and they have become even
more entrenched.165 The West needs to consider the implicit cultural values
that hinder Chinese directors in appreciating the function of rule-based
systems, and their lack of historical importance in building and sustaining
relationships in China. But Chinese directors also must appreciate the need
to reconcile the values that both sides have to offer.166 It is argued that one
of the main concerns that investors have, especially international investors
who do not have a clear understanding of the Chinese culture and legal
system, is the lack of stable legal and regulatory systems and reliance on
trust-based personal relationships as a means of obtaining resources and
doing business in China. 167 Therefore, awareness and understanding of
guanxi and cultivation of legitimate, clean, and sustainable guanxi
(including BtB, BtG, and PtP) matter in very significant ways, not only for
Chinese companies and their participants, but also for foreign companies
and their stakeholders. Within the domain of corporate governance, guanxi
primarily facilitates transactions between companies and their stakeholders,
leads to the furnishing of information, and provides creditable social
resources for companies.
A. PRECONDITION IN PROMOTINGACCOUNTABILITY:GUANXI AND
THEHARMONIOUS BUSINESS ENVIRONMENT
In this section, we will discuss the function of guanxi in creating a
harmonious and strategic business environment, which could be regarded as
a precondition and key virtue for more effective accountability. The
connections between accountability and guanxi-centric cultural factors is
relevant, dynamic, and of contemporary concern. These cultural factors
have had a major effect on history, values, and social and economic
transformation in China. It also applies to corporate governance and the
wenze system. An overview of the jurisdictions that are economically
advanced or developed and that are also Confucian societies, such as Japan,
163. Lovett, Simmons & Kali, supra note 73, at 236.
164. See Dunning & Kim, supra note 91; see generally Jianjun Zhang & Hean Tat Keh,
Interorganizational Exchanges in China: Organizational Forms and Governance Mechanism, 6
MGMT. & ORG. REV. 123 (2009).
165. Seung Ho Park & Yadong Luo, Guanxi and Organizational Dynamics: Organizational
Networking in Chinese Firms, 22 STRATEGICMGMT. J. 455, 466 (2001).
166. Weltzien Hoivik, supra note 87, at 467.
167. Fan, supra note 129, at 555–56.
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South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Taiwan, demonstrates that
economic development and the establishment of an institutional legal
system does not necessarily displace reliance on personal connections; in
fact, guanxi remains the core value of these societies.168 It is clear that
guanxi will continue to influence the development of Chinese corporate
governance and Chinese people’s understanding of business relationships,
as it is continuously transformed as part of its adaptation to new social
institutions and structures, unless new legal and commercial regimes are
introduced in China.169
Positive forms of guanxi include those between the company and their
internal and external stakeholders, such as guanxi between boards, among
directors, with government agents, with shareholders, and among
shareholders themselves and other stakeholders. Guanxi provides a valuable
entrepreneurial means to bridge gaps in information flows between
companies, and also between companies and primary external stakeholders
who are originally unrelated.170 Fitting in with Chinese traditions, corporate
governance participants rely on personal connections and loyalty, which
could be more effective than relying purely on organizational affiliations or
legal standards. These personal connections generate a smoother and more
harmonious business environment that is important for promoting
accountability in the various stages discussed in Part IV.C. In this way,
guanxi could help to build core competences and social harmony in the
business environment that lay a solid basis for a functional wenze system,
with involvement and contribution from corporate constituencies and other
external stakeholders, including government.
With the rapid economic growth, development of the legal and
regulatory institutions, and the continuing important role of the government
and the Party in the economy in China, guanxi is still relevant. Besides
being relevant, guanxi is sustainable and sometimes more reliable for
creating harmonious business environments for promoting accountability. It
is argued that strengthening pre-existing social connections is a much more
reliable strategy than bribing unconnected officials.171 Positive aspects of
guanxi may give the opportunity to promote accountability in countries like
China, where these cultural issues play a critical role in daily life and
guanxi becomes a common preoccupation.
Therefore, within a transitional corporate governance regime, unique in
China and which has administrative and economic characteristics as well as
government control and interference, guanxi serves as a means of signaling
trust and integrity in a system that lacks a strong background of institutions
168. LUO, supra note 74, at 31.
169. See generally Yang, supra note 76.
170. Seung Kyoon Shin, Michael Ishamn & G. Lawrence Sanders, An Empirical Investigation
of Socio-Cultural Factors of Information Sharing in China, 44 INFO. &MGMT. 165, 168 (2007).
171. LUO, supra note 74, at 29.
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and legal systems. 172 Even with the progressive legislative reform
evidenced by the implementation of new laws in the form of the 2005
Company Law, the 2006 Securities Law, and the 2005 Insolvency Law,
doing business in China is still personal and guanxi has not lost its
legitimacy. 173 Cultivating and maintaining clean and sustainable guanxi
between board members and administrative superiors is an effective way to
mitigate the negative effect of arbitrary intervention from the government
and the absence of a stable legal and regulatory environment, and it may
facilitate government support. Respectable guanxi with government does
facilitate business dealings and establishes a balance by complementing
ambiguous bureaucratic rules and principles with the flexibility of guanxi
and its cultural derivatives, which provide a more sustainable basis and
environment for accountability to take place.
B. THECRITERIA OF “GOOD”GUANXI AND AMORE EFFECTIVE
WENZE SYSTEM
If guanxi is going, in a dynamic manner,174 to have an impact on the
understanding and enforcement of accountability in corporate governance in
China, it may be worth, based on earlier discussion, promoting guanxi in a
way that leads to more accountability in corporations. A significant
contribution to achieving this could be made by the shareholders and
directors accommodating and cultivating a form of guanxi that does not
precipitate breaches of directors’ duties or involve bribery, corruption,
favoritism, or nepotism. In this respect, guanxi could help in the promotion
of accountability in corporate governance in general. Clean guanxi could
compensate for the fact that there is a lack of a formal and contractual
wenze system, due to weak law enforcement and ineffective corporate
governance mechanisms. It could also mitigate the negative impact on
accountability that results from other cultural factors, such as the practice of
mianzi. With the administrative rank of board members of SOEs and agents
of shareholders who hold SOE shares, guanxi could be viewed as an
informal, non-institutional and under-regulated mechanism that lubricates
the necessary link between various constituencies within the wenze system.
Guanxi and resources obtained from sustainable guanxi open an
alternative route for companies to be more actively engaged with
government and their stakeholders, which is key for the Chinese corporate
governance model in which the state plays a controlling role and where
172. Lovett, Simmons & Kali, supra note 73, at 240–42.
173. TIM AMBLER, MORGEN WITZEL & CHAO Xi, DOING BUSINESS IN CHINA 95–127 (2009);
see generally Jonathan Wilson & Ross Brennan, Doing Business in China: is the Importance of
Guanxi Diminishing?, 22 EUR. BUS. REV. 652 (2010).
174. It is argued by Su et al. that “[e]ffective guanxi is dynamic.” Chenting Su, Ronald K.
Mitchell & M. Joseph Sirgy, Enabling Guanxi Management in China: A Hierarchical Stakeholder
Model of Effective Guanxi, 71 J. BUS. ETHICS 301, 305 (2007).
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government interferes with boards’ decisions and corporate objectives. In
this hybrid model, the wenze system needs to be enhanced with informal,
flexible, and socio-cultural oriented factors, since companies cannot rely
only on the market or institutional instruments. Building and maintaining
sustainable guanxi could provide flexibility, efficiency, informal support,
and a harmonious business environment, which all could promote
accountability in the domain of corporate governance. Instead of rejecting
guanxi as illegitimate and corrupt on moral and political grounds, the
process of accountability could embrace the guanxi practice and view the
employment of guanxi as an integral part of developing sound corporate
governance.
This becomes possible and feasible with the development of the legal
system in China, especially with the far-reaching, highly published anti-
corruption campaign that was introduced since the 18th National Congress
of the Communist Party of China in 2012.175 In a jurisdiction with weak
formal law enforcement and strong bureaucratic institutions, a model of
“informal accountability” can be enabled and brought to maturity by
applying functional and sustainable guanxi. This informal accountability
model can help to overcome institutional barriers in three aspects: the
involvement and interference from the state and government; instability in
terms of regulatory changes, such as multiple legislative levels of central
government, stock exchanges, government authorities, and local
governments; and the difficulties in accessing market resources, especially
for companies that have weak government links, such as non-SOE listed
companies, which are growing in number,176 and listed companies in the
Growth Enterprise Market (GEM).177
Since all directors have a strong incentive to cultivate guanxi with
government officials while the boundaries between the state and the firm
remain blurred, it is normal that directors’ ties with government are
regarded as the most effective and direct ways to achieve corporate success.
The obvious way of promoting accountability through the BtG guanxi
network would be the provision of more efficient and accurate information
disclosure that is not normally available from the market.178 Sustainable and
175. See Shaomin Li, Assessment of and Outlook on China’s Corruption and Anticorruption
Campaigns: Stagnation in the Authoritarian Trap, 25 MOD. CHINA STUD. 139 (2017).
176. See generally Yuan Ding, Hua Zhang & Junxi Zhang, Private vs State Ownership and
Earnings Management: Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies, 15 CORP. GOVERNANCE: INT’L
REV. 223 (2007).
177. The first 28 companies were listed on the Shenzhen stock exchange on 30 October 2009 as
listed companies in the Growth Enterprise Market that was designed for accommodating vigorous
scientific and technological and innovation. See Chao Xu & Renyong Chi, Entrepreneur’s Social
Capital, Personal Characteristics and Firm Performance—An Empirical Analysis Based on
Chinese Listed Companies in Growth Enterprise Market, 28 SOFT SCIENCE 57 (2014).
178. Park & Luo, supra note 165, at 459 (recognizing that the significant role of guanxi in
information sharing with the business community and the government authorities in China, where
market information is greatly distorted like other transition economies).
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clean PtP guanxi179 should also facilitate good means of access to what is
often limited information that is only available to insiders.180 PtP guanxi
becomes a reliable source of necessary information for the disclosure
exercise from the board of directors in a more engaging, trustworthy, and
efficient manner to promote accountability. Guanxi that satisfies the criteria
also will reduce uncertainties and equivocality in decision-making through
more coherent information processing mechanisms.181 These mechanisms
may have the potential to greatly encourage accountability in stages 1 to 3
of the wenze system.182
Apart from information benefits, the board of directors may also want
to rely on guanxi and its cultural derivatives to establish a more harmonious
environment for the enquiry and explanation process. Huang argues that
guanxi is helpful in creating a more holistic, sincere, and heartfelt
harmonious relationship. 183 Guanxi will be helpful in generating a
cooperative spirit between constituencies in the enquiry and explanation
stages of accountability, and the outcome can be generated in a genuinely
harmonious environment. This is particularly important for a society that
relies heavily on mianzi and the benefits emanating from smooth enquiry
and explanation processes, and guanxi makes the fulfilment of the
accountability stages easier and more efficient.184 Guanxi and other cultural
derivatives could therefore be regarded as a way of resolving conflicts in
Chinese corporate management.185 Smooth and harmonious interpersonal
relationships due to social norms such as guanxi and renqing will ease the
conflict element of the enquiry and explanation process in order to ensure
that the relationship between the accountors and accountees is healthy and
sustainable.
CONCLUSION
Accountability is an essential aspect of corporate governance and, while
the Western notion of accountability is not encapsulated in any single
Chinese word, it has been argued that the wenze system of accountability as
considered in this Article comes very close to it in the context of corporate
governance. In light of this, the Article has examined the role of cultural
179. These PtP guanxi including those between members of management boards, supervisory
boards, independent directors, shareholders, and managers of institutional shareholders.
180. See Xin & Pearce, supra note 67, at 1643–64.
181. James B. Thomas & Linda Klebe Trevino, Information Processing in Strategic Alliance
Building: A Multiple-Case Approach, 30 J. MGMT. STUD. 779, 780–81 (1993).
182. See supra Part II.
183. See generally LI-LI HUANG, INTERPERSONAL HARMONY AND CONFLICT: INDIGENOUS
THEORIES AND RESEARCH (人际和谐与冲突──本土化的理论与研究) (1999).
184. Hwang provides a theoretical model to explain the Chinese way of conflict management
and resolution. Using the concept of “harmony” as the axis while mianzi and guanxi are regarded
as “two wings” of harmony. See Hwang, supra note 88, at 954–55.
185. See generally Kwang Kuo Hwang, Guanxi and Mientze: Conflict Resolution in Chinese
Society, 7 INTERCULTURAL COMM. STUD. 17 (1997).
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factors, namely guanxi and its derivatives, in corporate governance in China
to determine what effect, if any, these cultural factors have on the operation
and development of the wenze system in large listed companies. The Article
has found that cultural elements do affect accountability in corporate
governance, and in some situations significantly so. With the growth in
importance of the economic and political influence of China within the
global trading community, the management implications of guanxi also
grow in importance. 186 Guanxi and its cultural derivatives have to be
factored into any reform considerations and any changes to law or practice
have to be sensitive to these cultural pillars.
This Article’s analysis demonstrates that guanxi is a double-edge
sword, for while it can be an impediment it is not totally inimical to
accountability. Indeed, it might enhance accountability if it and its
derivatives are utilized in a positive way in promoting a more sustainable
and harmonious business environment. We identified three criteria on
which guanxi could exhibit positive impact, namely legitimacy, reduction
of transaction costs, and promotion of flexibility. In this sense, guanxi will
be likely to mature as a traditional cultural value and become less visible
and more sophisticated and instrumental, with more emphasis on strategic
management policies and business outcomes than on politics and
corruption. It could become a unique but effective code of ethics that helps
to promote accountability in corporate governance in China, as well as
fostering corporate governance in general. Within this positive and
functional guanxi circle, shareholders and other stakeholders will work
towards forming a “guanxi qun” (nexus or group of guanxi) based on their
interests or need to achieve a common objective or goal, which is
promoting greater accountability and ultimately the success of the
company. The cultural factors will help companies with more diverse and
comprehensible information, obtained at lower cost and operating in a more
harmonious environment, to establish accountability in the long term.
This Article also argues that cultural factors in general, and guanxi in
particular, could certainly enhance accountability in being able to
compensate for the lack of law and enforcement in the Chinese corporate
sector. In Chinese business there are two kinds of laws; on the one had there
is formal law (including legislation) and on the other hand there is “deeply
rooted cultural ‘law.’”187 With the latter, which includes the positive values
of guanxi, it should be consistent with key elements of the wenze system.
Enhanced information access, cooperation, and informal support will make
the wenze system smoother, more harmonious, and effective, all of which
are positive for the long-term development of corporations.
186. Su, Mitchell & Sirgy, supra note 174, at 305.
187. Braendle, Gasser & Noll, supra note 33, at 402.
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However, we do not deny that guanxi and other cultural factors can
have a negative impact as far as accountability is concerned. Nevertheless,
we contend that there are enough indications that it is possible to employ
legitimate, clean, and sustainable guanxi within a wenze system in order to
ultimately promote better accountability in corporate governance, and at the
same time recognizing that in certain cases guanxi will, as employed by
some, fail to do so. It is acknowledged that guanxi can make the processes
of corporate governance vulnerable, but on the other hand it has the
potential to fulfil an important role in fostering accountability, especially in
the absence of effective law and enforcement. Certainly, to provide a
positive impact guanxi and its derivatives need to be carefully applied when
promoting accountability, since they may be exploited for personal interests
instead of mutual benefit with corporate participants, considering that BtB
and BtG guanxi always start from PtP guanxi.
Finally, it is interesting to note that many in the West are calling for
greater trust in corporate governance, and yet guanxi is essentially built on
trust,188 so one might assert that there is greater trust evident in Chinese
companies. Perhaps a problem with guanxi is that it is misunderstood by
non-Chinese people and this might cause concern over whether those
involved in corporate governance are truly accountable, which might stymie
attempts by the Chinese government to ensure the adoption of international
benchmarks and for Chinese corporate governance to be accepted by
international markets.
188. See Lovett, Simmons & Kali, supra note 73, at 232; Guthrie, supra note 81, at 261; see
also Stephen S. Standifird & R. Scott Marshall, The Transaction Cost Advantage of Guanxi-Based
Business Practices, 35 J. WORLD BUS. 21, 24 (2000).
